A paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined. Financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital, and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures. Thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the Goldsmith-McKinnon-Shaw view on economic development. The model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the Kuznets hypothesis. In particular, in the transition from a primitive slow-growing economy to a developed fastgrowing one, a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens.
I. Introduction
Two themes pervade the growth and development literature. The first is Kuznets's (1955) Granger sense) runs in either and both ways. Finally, historical case studies such as those undertaken in Cameron (1967) have stressed the key importance of financial factors in the economic development of several European countries.
The current analysis focuses on economic growth, institutional development, and the distribution of income. Economic growth fosters investment in organizational capital, which in turn promotes further growth. In the model, institutions arise endogenously to facilitate trade in the economy, and they do so in two ways: First, trading organizations allow for a higher expected rate of return on investment to be earned. In particular, in the environment modeled, information is valuable since it allows investors to learn about the aggregate state of technology. Through a research-type process, intermediaries collect and analyze information that allows investors' resources to flow to their most profitable use. By investing through an intermediary, individuals gain access, so to speak, to a wealth of experience of others. While Boyd and Prescott (1986) also stress the role that intermediaries can play in overcoming information frictions, the nature of these frictions is different. Second, trading organizations also play the traditional role of pooling risks across large numbers of investors. Townsend (1978) highlights the insurance role of intermediaries, but not their role in allowing a more efficient allocation of resources for production. Thus by investing through intermediated structures, individuals obtain both a higher and a safer return.
As in Townsend (1978 Townsend ( , 1983b , investment in organizational capital is costly. Consequently, high-income economies are better disposed to undertake such financial superstructure building than ones with lowincome levels. The development of financial superstructure, since it allows a higher return to be earned on capital investment, in turn feeds back on economic growth and income levels. In this latter regard, the current analysis is a close cousin of Townsend (1983a) , which also examines the relationship between financial structure and economic activity, although within the context of a framework in which the extent of financial markets is exogenously imposed and that abstracts from the issue of growth. Also, in the spirit of recent work by Romer (1986) , Rebelo (1987) , and Lucas (1988) , growth is modeled as an endogenous process; that is, it does not depend on exogenous technological change.
The dynamics of the development process resemble the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis. In the early stages of development, an economy's financial markets are virtually nonexistent and it grows slowly. Financial superstructure begins to form as the economy approaches the intermediate stage of the growth cycle. Here the economy's growth and savings rates both increase, and the distribution of income across the rich and poor widens. By maturity, the economy has developed an extensive structure for financial intermediation. In the final stage of development the distribution of income across agents stabilizes, the savings rate falls, and the economy's growth rate converges (although perhaps nonmonotonically) to a higher level than that prevailing during its infancy. According to Lindert and Williamson (1985, pp. 342-43) , "it is exactly this kind of correlation-rising inequality coinciding with rising savings and accumulation rates during Industrial Revolutions-that encouraged the trade-off belief [between growth and inequality] among classical economists who developed their growth models while the process was underway in England."
II. The Economic Environment
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents distributed over the interval [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure X. An agent's goal in life is to maximize his expected lifetime utility as given by E 13 t In ctl with 0 < P < 1, where ct is his period t consumption flow and P3 the discount factor.
Each agent is entitled to operate one or both of two linear production technologies. The first offers a safe but relatively low return on investment. Here it_ 1 units of capital invested at the end of period t -1 yield bit_ I units of output in period t, or yt. Thus, more formally, yt = bit-1, where 8 is a technological constant. The second investment opportunity yields a higher (unconditional) expected return but is more risky. Specifically, with this technology, production is governed by the process yt = (Ot + Et)it 1, where Ot + Et represents a composite technology shock. Each technology can be operated only once by the individual in a period. Now, at the beginning of each period t, an agent will have a certain amount of wealth, kt, at his disposal. This wealth either can be used for current consumption or can be invested in capital for use in production next period. Individuals are heterogeneous in the sense that their stocks of capital in any given period may differ. At the start of time, each agent is endowed with a certain amount of goods or capital, ko. The initial distribution of wealth in the society is represented by the cumulative distribution function H0: R?? -+ [0, 1].
The period t technological shock has two components. The first component, Ot, represents an aggregate disturbance and thus is common across technologies, while the second, Et, portrays an individual-(or project-) specific shock. All that an agent can costlessly observe is the realized composite rate of return Ot + Et on his own project. The is automatically satisfied when Py = 1 (no proportional transactions costs).3
There are three potential benefits from establishing networks. First, information has a public-good aspect to it. Each entrepreneur desires information on the realized project returns of others. This would allow his production decisions to be better made since such realized returns contain useful information about the magnitude of the aggregate shock. Even if such information was public knowledge, no individual entrepreneur would want to produce first since by waiting he would gain the experience of others. Thus there is a coordination problem inherent in individual entrepreneurs' production planning that trading agreements may be able to overcome. Second, trading mechanisms could potentially be used to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk associated with individual production projects. Third, they may allow an agent better opportunities for transferring consumption across time through arrangements for borrowing and lending. The emergence of such trading arrangements is the subject of the next section.
III. Competitive Equilibrium

Financial Intermediation
Many organizational structures can be decentralized with a subset of agents acting as go-betweens who intermediate economic activity for some larger set of individuals. They charge competitively determined fees for this service. Suppose that in period t -1 some individual in the economy has assumed (at a cost of ax) the role of being an intermediary for a set of agents A, 1 with positive measure. This go- 
-[F(t) -H(t)]dt > 0 so that fj' [F(t) -H(t)]dt > -f ' [F(t) -H(t)]dt > -fxs [F(t) -H(t)]dt.
between offers the following service: In exchange for a once-and-forall fee of q plus the rights to operate an individual's project, the intermediary promises a return of r(Ot+1) per unit of capital invested in any period t + j -1, with the go-between absorbing all costs associated with trading. Needless to say, since the go-between's goal is to maximize profits, he will adopt the most efficient scheme possible for intermediation. In pursuit of this end, let the intermediary follow in every period the investment plan outlined below for period t.
To begin with, suppose that person invests it, -(j) units of capital with the intermediary at the end of period t -1. Then the aggregate amount of capital (net of the proportional transactions costs) that the intermediary has to invest in t from these deposits is y x fA, l it-(j)dA (j), where again X is the Lebesgue measure. Now, let the intermediary randomly select some finite number of high-risk/ return projects, say T, from the set At-1; denote this set of projects by Ate_ 1. Each of the "trial" projects selected is funded with the amount Now, if the "test statistic" t is greater than y8, then the remaining high-risk/return projects operated by the intermediary are each funded with yKt units of capital; otherwise the go-between invests its resources in safe projects.5
Note that relative to the size of the intermediary's portfolio of projects, the number of production technologies chosen for research purposes is negligible. More precisely, the set of experimental projects, At_ 1, being countable has (Lebesgue) measure zero. Consequently, other than the important informational role these test projects play, they have a negligible impact on the profits earned by the intermediary. Thus the net rate of return on the intermediary's production activities, or z(Ot, Ot-), will be given by 4For the purpose of taking sums, reindex the (countable) collection of agents in the set A' by the natural numbers.
5 Envision each period as consisting of two subintervals. In the first subinterval, production is undertaken. Production can occur at any time within this subinterval: some projects can be undertaken early, others late. The intermediary's trial projects are run early, the rest late. Agents who choose not to transact with an intermediary are indifferent about when to operate their projects within this subinterval since they cannot observe at that time what is happening to production elsewhere in the economy. In the second subinterval the output from production is distributed and agents decide how much to consume currently out of their proceeds and how much to invest for future consumption. (1) + y max(8, Ot)(q -() fA,> _dX(j) = 0, where At' I C At-1 represents the set of agents entering into an agreement with the go-between for the first time at t -1. This condition necessitates that r(Ot) = y max(8, Ot) and q = a, since it must hold for arbitrary fA_ it-1(j) dXj) 0 and fA'_ dXAj) ? 0.6 Note that the 6 Note here that it is being presumed that the intermediary commits himself forever to the policy of paying the return r(O,) in each period t on any and all deposits made in t-1, subject only to the stipulation that the depositor has paid at some time the onceand-for-all fee of q. The possibility of default is precluded by assumption. Now suppose that, for some fAt, i, I(j)dX(j) 2 0 and fA I dX(j) 2 0, condition (1) could become negative with positive probability. Then with positive probability, any intermediary could go bankrupt in the first period of its operation and would have to default on its obligations to depositors (since the intermediary would owe an infinitely large amount relative to his start-up wealth). This, though, is prohibited. Any agent can become an intermediary, rather than transact with one, if it is in his own best interest to do so. Alternatively, then, suppose that r(O,) and q are such that (1) never becomes negative and is strictly positive with nonzero probability. Here the intermediary could realize infinite profits in any particular period with positive probability and never realize any losses, a situation ruled out by the assumption of free entry into the industry. 7 In a similar vein, Gertler and Rogoff (1989) assume that the probability that an investment project will attain a good return is an increasing function of the amount of funds invested. This again could provide a rationale for agents to pool funds. their investment projects. In principle, their framework could be incorporated into a growth model. Finally, Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) stress the importance of large intermediary structures for minimizing the costs to lenders (depositors) of monitoring the behavior of both borrowers and intermediary managers.
The current paper stresses the role that intermediaries play in collecting and analyzing information, thereby facilitating the migration of funds to the place in the economy in which they have the highest social return. The model of intermediation presented above could undoubtedly be generalized to capture reality better. For instance, industry-specific shocks could be introduced. Suppose that the risky technology now operates in several sectors. Let the risky technology be formulated as yt = [Ot + vt(l) + Et(j)]it 1, where vt(l) is a disturbance specific to industry 1. Now through a sampling process analogous to that analyzed above, intermediaries could uncover Ot + vt(l) for each industry 1. If the aggregate state of the economy warrantedthat is, if Ot + vt(l) > -y for some i-the funds available would be directed to the sector(s) with the highest vt. Otherwise, the resources would be invested in the safe technology (which would perhaps be better labeled in the current context as an "industry").
Market Participation
Not all agents may find the terms of the investment contract offered currently attractive. In particular, for some agents it may not be worthwhile to pay a lump-sum fee of q in order to gain permanent access to the intermediation technology paying a random return of r(Ot) in each t. Thus it is natural at this point to examine the determination of participation in the exchange network. To do this, consider the decision making of an individual in period t who is currently outside of the intermediated sector. His actions in this period are summarized by the outcome of the following dynamic programming problem: once an individual enters the intermediated sector, he will never leave it. This conjecture will now be tested.
If it is true, the functional equation ( By lemma 3, the sets BC and B are nonempty. Also, k = inf B and k = sup BC. Clearly, it is in the interest of those individuals who have a capital stock kt E B to establish a trading link with the go-between, but not so for those agents with an endowment kt E BC. Equally as evident, it is possible to have a competitive equilibrium prevailing in period t in which some agents choose to participate in the market sector and others choose to remain outside; this will depend on the distribution of capital across individuals who were outside of the trading network in t -1.
Equilibrium
To summarize the discussion so far, it has been shown that there exists a competitive equilibrium of the form defined below.
DEFINITION.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions, v(kt) and w(kt), savings rules, s(kt) and P(kt), and pricing functions, r(Ot+ 1) and q, such that The following proposition concludes this section. Now denote the decision rules governing optimal savings and portfolio allocation in problem (P5) by St = s(kt) and 4t = (kt). These individuals will save an amount s(kt) that is greater than Ikt since they expect at some future date to incur the lump-sum cost q of developing a link with the exchange system. 
X Vk(S '(-I(O + E) + (1 -+) 8) -q)dF(0)dG(E).
It is easy to show that the operator T is a contraction whose fixed point defined by w = Tw is characterized by (P5).13 Thus given any {4(k)(O + E) + [1 -4(k)]b}dF(O)dG(E) J (k) [s(k){4(k)(O + E) + [1 -(k) -s(s(k){4)(k)(O +
E
I{P(k)(O + e) + [1 -O(k)]B}dF(O)dG(E) [s(k){4)(k)(O + E) + [1 -(k)]fl} -s(g(k){+(k)(O + E) + [1 -+ E fD(s(k), 4(k))
4(k)(O + E) + [1 -I (k)]I, dF(0)dG(E), (1 -P)((k){4(k)(O + E) + [1 -4(k)],} -q) where s(k) denotes the optimal policy function. Next, examine the solutions for the policy functions to each of these Euler equations; they are the same, implying s(k) = s(k). Thus the fixed point to (8) must be represented by (P5).
initial function wo, limper wI = w and limpe SI = s. Now, first it will be demonstrated that if w I > wI 1, then sJ > sJ-1 and wJ+ 1 > wl. Second, to start the induction hypothesis, a concave wo will be chosen so that wl > wo and so(k) > Pk. Consequently, s(k) = limit sl(k) > Pk since sl(k) is an increasing sequence.
Assume that w I> wIj 1. From (8), the first-order condition governing the optimal choice of s1 is Finally, let wo be specified as in (4) and consequently be concave. Then using (2), (4), and (9), one can write the efficiency condition governing the optimal choice of so as 1 fy max(b, t, I )dF(Ot+ 1). Consequently, there will be an increase in inequality across the very rich and very poor segments of the population. The rationale underlying this conjecture is that very poor agents are likely to remain outside of the intermediated sector for some time to come and consequently are heavily discounting the future cost of developing a link with the exchange network. Additionally, from (P4) it is known that in circumstances in which an agent will never transact with the go-between, the amount st = t3kt is saved. Since this can be done for any e and T, the right-hand side of (13) since investment could be more efficiently undertaken. The model yields a development process consistent, at least, with casual observation. In the early stages of development in which exchange is largely unorganized, growth is slow. As income levels rise, financial structure becomes more extensive, economic growth becomes more rapid, and income inequality across the rich and poor widens. In maturity, an economy has a fully developed financial structure, attains a stable distribution of income across people, and has a higher growth rate than in its infancy.
Appendix
It will now be demonstrated that the competitive equilibrium constructed in Section III is Pareto optimal. The discussion is brief, drawing on material presented in Lucas and Stokey ( 
Pareto Optimality
It remains to establish that the valuation equilibrium modeled above is Pareto optimal. To do this, a bit more notation must be developed. To begin with, observe that under any interesting allocation rule for the economy, entry into the developed sector will be permanent. This must be so since it is feasible for an agent in the developed sector to duplicate the returns he could realize in autarky by simply operating the high-risk/return and safe technologies in isolation from others in the sector. Therefore, to conserve notation, attention will be limited to situations in which entry into the developed sector is permanent. Note that when an individual moves in period t from a less developed sector to the developed one, he takes with him a certain stock of wealth in terms of goods, to be denoted by kt. Thus let agent j's period t allocation in a less developed location be represented by But this leads to the violation of the feasibility condition (A15) at some date t. Similarly, assume that (A16) holds strictly for any individual j. This would lead to the violation of the feasibility condition (A14) at some date. Therefore, it is not possible for the proposed allocation to make some set of agents in the economy better off without making others worse off. Q.E.D.
Remark.-As is discussed in Stokey et al. (1989) , the first welfare theorem does not depend on any assumptions about technology (such as the absence of fixed costs).
